











The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of technology and spatial agglomeration in decisions 
about vertical integration. It starts from the hypotheses that the business group, defined as a set 
of firms under common ownership and control, is the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s 
boundary. We use information drawn from input-output tables to detect the presence of positive 
inter-industry exchanges and whether or not activities in a group are vertically related. Accounting 
for endogeneity problems, we estimate Probit and Linear Probability models to empirically 
investigate the role of technology and spatial agglomeration on vertical integration decisions. 
Consistent with property rights theory, our results show that the technology intensity of acquirers 
matters for backward integration choices and moreover, that agglomeration plays a role in vertical 
integration only when it operates jointly with technology. 
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Decisions about vertical integration, i.e. control in the different stages of the production 
chain,  constitute  one of the  main strategic choices made by firms. The vertical 
integration decision has been studied extensively from a theoretical standpoint in both 
the industrial organization literature and in the literature taking a transaction cost and 
property right perspective on which this paper mainly draws.   
The industrial organization literature emphasizes the creation and exploitation of market 
power as one of the main motives for vertical integration in situations where markets for 
intermediate goods  are  non-competitive  (Tirole, 1988).  As a result,  this literature 
focuses on forward integration and also considers forms of contractual arrangements 
between autonomous firms as a means of exercising vertical restraints in intermediate 
markets (Carlton and Perloff, 2005).  In contrast, the literature on vertical integration, 
based on transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory (PRT), 
emphasizes the presence of joint ownership and control rights over production activities 
to separate vertical integration from market transactions (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). 
This literature is mostly concerned with explaining the scope and boundaries of the firm 
–  i.e. which activities are integrated  within the same ownership  –  and emphasizes 
backward rather than forward integration. 
TCE (Williamson, 1985; Joskow, 1991; Lieberman, 1991) and PRT (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) stress the importance of technology in influencing 
whether  vertically related  activities  are brought  within the boundary of the firm. 
Specifically, both point to the role of the technology intensity of the buyer and supplier 
in influencing backward integration.  Backward integration is more likely for more 
complex inputs and when the environment in which the firms operate is more uncertain. 
However, TCE and PRT diverge as regards the direction of this influence. According to 
TCE, the supplier’s technology intensity is one of the most important factors in the 
buyer’s decision to integrate an activity while PRT predicts that where suppliers are 
more technology intensive, there will be  less vertical integration (Whinston, 2001; 
Acemoglu et al., 2004).   2 
TCE also suggests a role for spatial agglomeration in vertical integration. The literature 
on spatial agglomeration stresses the importance of market-based relationships among 
firms located in clusters, based on lower transactions costs. These are explained as 
being due to the lower levels of opportunism between economic agents and reduced 
information asymmetry (Wood and Parr, 2005). Specifically, the literature on industrial 
districts emphasizes the role of social capital and trust in shaping vertical relationships 
between independent agents, underlining the co-operative nature of such relationships 
(Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 1992).  
The main aim of this paper is to assess the role of technology and agglomeration in 
influencing firms’ decisions to integrate production activities. In this paper, we consider 
ownership and control as the main feature in the definition of firms’ boundaries, i.e. 
integration (Hodgson, 2002). Specifically, we recognize the business group, defined as a 
set of legal units under the same ownership and control, as the appropriate unit to 
delimit the firm’s boundary. The characteristics of the legal units belonging to a group 
can  thus  be used to analyse some aspects of firm’s  organization, such as vertical 
integration. 
To investigate the role played by technology and agglomeration in affecting vertical 
integration,  we  use  the  input-output table to detect whether or  not activities are 
vertically related,  and the strength of these  relationships.  On the basis  of dyadic 
associations of production activities with positive intra-industry exchange,  and 
accounting for endogeneity problems, we use binary choice models - Probit and Linear 
Probability models  -  to identify  some of the factors affecting the probability of 
observing backward vertical integration. This is done by comparing the actual presence 
of vertical integration in business groups with those expected according to the input-
output table, following the methodology developed in Acemoglu et al. (2004).  
Our analysis is based on an original data-set developed by ISTAT (Italian National 
Statistical Institute) covering all manufacturing firms organized as joint-stock 
companies in 2001. The analysis refers to 8,661 manufacturing groups, controlling more 
than 30,000 legal units. As far as agglomeration is concerned, we use a set of dummy 
variables related to belonging to business groups in an industrial district, as officially 
defined by ISTAT. In the case of technology, we use data on technology intensity at 
industry level based on R&D expenditure.   3 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section two, we briefly discuss our reasons for 
taking the business group as the appropriate unit to delimit firm boundaries; we then 
examine the theoretical predictions about  the  relationships between agglomeration, 
technology and vertical integration,  and develop the research  hypotheses to be 
empirically tested. In Section three, we describe the characteristics of the dataset and 
how  the variables are defined and measured. Section four explains the econometric 
strategy  adopted,  presents  and interprets  the results of the empirical analysis, and 
discusses the robustness analysis. Finally, Section five presents the main conclusions 
and discusses the implications and limitations of the study.  
 
Related literature and research hypotheses 
The business groups as an organizational form 
A business group is defined as a set of legally distinct units controlled by the same 
owner. Most of the literature on business groups is devoted to justifying why they exist 
and comparing the behaviour and performance of firms belonging to business groups 
with those of independent firms (Bertrand  et al., 2002; Feenstra et al., 2003). This 
literature mainly focuses  on financial aspects  (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). The 
pyramidal group is regarded as a financial mechanism to minimize the amount of capital 
needed by the ultimate owner to control business activities, i.e. as a mechanism to 
separate control rights, concentrated in the hand of the ultimate owner, from cash flow 
rights, dispersed among the minority shareholders in the companies belonging to the 
group. 
Alongside the financial interpretation of pyramidal groups, there is another important 
strand of literature that focuses on organizational issues. This literature considers the 
group as an organizational mechanism alternative to both the internal hierarchy and the 
market  (Goto, 1982; Kester, 1992).  The  theoretical  approach normally used by 
researchers who adopt this perspective is TCE. Their work is usually aimed at 
explaining why the relationships among the firms belonging to a business group might 
be more efficient in terms of transaction/organizational costs than those in integrated 
firms or in market transactions between independent firms. According to TCE, business 
groups are a hybrid organizational form since, by definition, hierarchy is associated   4 
with a legal unit. Moreover,  it considers that the business  group  is  similar  to  a 
multidivisional firm (M-form),  where the role of the central direction (the ultimate 
owner) is one of allocating resources to existing divisions (firms), and deciding whether 
they should be opened (set up or acquired) or closed (liquidated or sold) (Chandler, 
1982).  
By considering the group as an organizational form, we contend that ownership and 
control of business activities are appropriate to delimit the boundaries of the firm. We 
argue  that this is more appropriate than using  the legal boundaries, which consider 
individual companies without reference to their ownership and control.
1
Taking the business group as the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s boundary, the 
characteristics of the legal units belonging to it can thus be used to analyse some aspects 
of firm behaviour and organization. Within this perspective our aim, which is different 
to most of the literature on this issue, is not to explain why business groups exist, but to 
analyse the role of spatial agglomeration and technology in determining some features 
 Although the 
ultimate owner can intervene ‘discretionally’ in the main strategic decisions of the 
controlled companies, the contractual relationships between owner and directors are 
different from those between a general office and the heads of divisions. In fact, in the 
case of the M-form the hierarchical relationship is characterized by stronger non-
contractual components, which are typical of the employee–employer relationship, 
while in the case of business groups the relationship between owner and the controlled 
companies is conditioned by the legal system. These differences are more evident in 
operational (i.e., day-to-day) decisions and are not significant in the case of strategic 
decisions such as the decisions to vertically integrate activities. In addition, the 
development of integrated information systems and the formation of consolidated 
accounts allow the economic and financial relationships within the group to be 
formalized. This can be interpreted as further evidence of the capability of the ultimate 
owner to influence not only the strategic but also the administrative functions in the 
controlled companies.  
                                                 
1. ‘La dimension «entreprise» n’est plus suffisante pour analyser le système productif. De plus en plus 
d’entreprises s’organisent sous forme de groupes: une société appelée tête de groupe, détient 
majoritairement le capital d’une ou de plusieurs entreprises, appelée filiales. Ces acteurs économiques 
s’organisent ainsi pour des raisons d’efficacité productive, financière et fiscale. Désormais, c’est au 
niveau du groupe que certains indicateurs économiques deviennent pertinent, comme la concentration de 
l’activité’ (INSEE, 2004: 5).   5 
of firm behaviour and organization. The group form is used specifically by firms to 
expand control over different business activities; it is the organizational form suited to 
implementing diversification and vertical integration strategies (Iacobucci and Rosa, 
2005; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). This is particularly true in the case of vertical 
integration decisions,  as the legal autonomy of firms belonging to the same group 
reduces the risks associated with vertical integration by facilitating the ability of 
controlled firms to acquire and sell in the market. 
Technology, agglomeration and vertical integration 
The industrial organization literature emphasizes the creation and exploitation of market 
power as a reason for vertical integration in the presence of non-competitive 
intermediate markets. Forward or backward integration can occur to acquire or prevent 
market power in intermediate markets (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). Most of this 
literature is concerned with the welfare consequences of vertical integration and, as a 
result, with antitrust policy towards vertical mergers. For this reason, it also considers 
different forms of contractual arrangements between autonomous firms as means of 
vertical restraints.  
TCE and PRT, in contrast, emphasize the presence of joint ownership and control rights 
on production activities, to separate vertical integration from market transactions. These 
theoretical approaches are mostly concerned with explaining the scope and boundaries 
of the firm – i.e. which activities are integrated within the same ownership – and give 
specific emphasis to backward rather than forward integration. Both TCE and PRT 
stress the importance of technology in influencing the choice to integrate vertically 
related-activities within the boundary of the firm. Backward integration is more likely 
for more complex inputs and when the environment in which the firms operate is more 
uncertain. Although the assumptions and conclusions of the two theories appear very 
similar it has been shown that this is not always the case (Whinston, 2001; Woodruff, 
2002; Whinston, 2003).  According to TCE (Williamson, 1985), vertical integration 
results from the need to prevent ex-post hold-up problems resulting from transaction-
specific investments. Whatever the source of the specificity, its presence allows firms at 
one particular stage in the production process to appropriate the quasi-rents earned by   6 
firms at another stage due to lack of alternative sources of supply or demand (Joskow, 
2005).
2
The advantages of vertical integration in reducing or avoiding the costs of market 
transactions must be compared with the costs of producing within the firm (cost of 
integration), which depend on the ability to monitor employees and to discover and 
spread information effectively within the organization. For this reason, the size and 
characteristics of the organization should influence the degree of vertical integration. 
Other things being equal, size and diversification should be negatively correlated with 
the degree of vertical integration while the implementation of decentralized (e.g., M-
form)  organizations is expected to be positively related to the level of vertical 
integration (Levy, 1985: 440). This argument is particularly relevant in our case because 
business groups can be considered an organizational form that allows  superior 
coordination and control of business activities by combining decentralization of 
operating decisions and centralization of strategic decisions.  
 
According to TCE, the degree of asset specificity of suppliers is the most important 
factor in a buyer’s decision to integrate an activity (Lieberman, 1991; Whinston, 2003). 
Asset specificity refers to  the extent to which the  investment made to support a 
particular transaction has limited or no value when redeployed for any other purpose 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). Specificity can refer to location (site specificity), the 
specialization of physical assets (physical asset specificity) or the specialization of 
human skills (human asset specificity). One of the most important factors affecting asset 
specificity (both physical asset and human asset specificity) is the technology intensity 
of production, which is related to the amount of knowledge and learning required. 
According to TCE we can propose that: 
 
H1: backward integration (i.e., the control of input suppliers) is positively related 
to the technological intensity of suppliers.   
 
In contrast to the TCE approach, which emphasizes ex-post transaction problems, PRT 
focuses on distortions in ex-ante investment. The residual rights of control guaranteed 
                                                 
2  Joskow  (2005)  maintains that TCE is concerned with ex ante  and  ex post  inefficiencies arising in 
bilateral relationships, but recognizes that Williamson and other authors generally emphasize more ex 
post haggling and associated inefficiencies.    7 
by ownership of assets are particularly valuable in situations of ex-ante  incomplete 
contracting and ex- post opportunist behaviour. PRT predictions are more difficult to 
test empirically than TCE theory as their testing requires a great deal of information 
about the trading relationship between acquirer and supplier (Whinston, 2003). This is 
probably why much of the empirical literature on vertical integration is based on TCE 
and relies on single industry case studies. It is only recently that a few studies have 
adopted a cross-industry approach to explore the intensity and the determinants of 
vertical integration (Fan and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004).
3
Acemoglu  et al.’s  (2004)  approach is particularly interesting in our context.  Their 
objective is to assess the role of technology intensity in the vertical integration choices 
of firms. The assumption is that technology intensity of production, especially when 
captured in terms of R&D investment, is closely associated with asset specificity and 
will generate the types of problems in trading relationships that are highlighted by the 
TCE and PRT approaches. Following the PRT approach their model predicts that the 
technology intensity of producer and supplier has opposing effects on the likelihood of 
vertical integration. In the case of backward integration ‘greater technology intensity of 
the producers should be associated with greater vertical integration, greater technology 
intensity of the supplier should be associated with less vertical integration’ (Acemoglu 
et al., 2004: 12). This is because within the PRT approach vertical integration affects 
the investment incentives of suppliers and producers; when the technology intensity of 
the supplier is high ‘backward integration becomes less likely, because now the 
supplier’s investment is more important, and backward integration, by reducing the 
outside option of the supplier, discourages her investment’ (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 11). 
Hence the proposition that:  
  
 
H2: backward integration (i.e., the control of input suppliers) is more likely when 
the producer (acquirer) is more technology intensive, and less likely when the 
supplier is more technology intensive.  
 
Finally, TCE also suggests a role for spatial agglomeration in vertical integration. The 
literature on spatial agglomeration stresses the importance of market-based relationships 
                                                 
3. ‘Despite a number of well-established theories and a prominent public debate on the effect of 
technology and technical change on the internal organization of the firm, there is little evidence on the 
determinants of vertical integration’ (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 26).   8 
among firms located in clusters, as a result of the lower level of transactions costs. This 
is generally explained as being due to the lower levels of opportunism between 
economic agents and fewer information asymmetries. The low level of opportunism is 
explained by the homogeneity of clusters in terms of local institutions, ‘culture’, social 
capital, language, etc. (Wood and Parr, 2005). The lack of information asymmetry is 
explained by spatial proximity, frequency of face-to-face contacts and, more generally, 
local knowledge spillovers (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Moreover, the literature on 
industrial districts emphasizes the role of social capital and trust in shaping vertical 
relationships between independent agents, underlining the co-operative nature of such 
relationships (Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 1992; Dei Ottati, 1994). In emphasizing the role 
of co-operation and the lack of opportunism in vertical relations between firms, this 
literature predicts that firms located in industrial clusters will show lower levels of 
vertical integration than similar non-agglomerated firms. 
Within a TCE perspective, the focus on behavioural variables tends to undervalue the 
role of asset specificity as a determinant of transaction costs. We do not question the 
hypothesis that in industrial clusters the level  of opportunism and information 
asymmetry is lower than in non-agglomerated areas. Nevertheless, according to TCE 
the problem is not the ‘intensity’ of opportunism or information asymmetry but whether 
or not they are present (Williamson, 1985). In fact, the TCE approach takes 
opportunism and bounded rationality of agents as an ex-ante behavioural hypothesis and 
considers the level of transaction specific investments as the main determinant of 
transaction costs. 
The reduction in information asymmetry as a result of spatial agglomeration is 
theoretically well demonstrated and empirically investigated. However, its effect on the 
degree of vertical integration is ambiguous. Some authors maintain that face-to-face 
contacts, long-term supply relationships and sharing of market and technology 
information can favour the acquisition of firms within agglomerated area, thus 
substituting hierarchical governance for  transactions between independent firms 
(Brioschi et al., 2002). At the same time, there are studies that suggest that the reduction 
in information asymmetry should reduce transaction costs thus favouring market-based 
relationships between agents (Wood and Parr, 2005). Assessment of which of the above 
mentioned  mechanisms  is  more important in determining the relationship between   9 
agglomeration and vertical integration must be tested empirically. So far, the empirical 
relationships between agglomeration, technology and vertical integration have been 
investigated mainly on the basis of anecdotal evidence or case studies of specific 
clusters (Enright, 1995). According to TCE, we propose that: 
 
H3: backward integration (i.e., the control of input suppliers) is less likely when 
the producer (acquirer) and the supplier are located within the same 
agglomerated area.  
Data and variables 
Business groups: definition and characteristics 
We use a data-set on business groups developed by ISTAT. Business groups are 
identified through control linkages between pairs of legal units, according to European 
level operational guidelines (Eurostat, 2003). The data-set was built considering the 
population of joint-stock companies in the Italian economy. The data refer to the year 
2001.
4 For each legal unit belonging to a group, information is available on its activity 
(at five-digit level), location, number of employees, sales, ownership share, etc. The 
industry of the group is determined according to the activity of the largest company. As 
a result, manufacturing groups are identified as those groups where the largest company 
is a manufacturing firm. Based on these criteria, we identified 8,661 manufacturing 
groups. These groups control 34,358 firms, of which 28,579 are production units and 
the others are financial or foreign firms. We exclude the latter two types from our 
analysis, considering only production firms.
5
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about our analysis. Groups control an average of 
four companies each with large number of small groups having only two companies 
(two-thirds of the total). The presence of a large number of small groups also explains 
the low percentage of backward integrated groups; in fact, most of the small groups 
belong to traditional industries where there is high specialization along the production 
chain.  
  
                                                 
4 For further information about the procedures used to develop the dataset see Cainelli et al. (2006). 
5 Foreign companies were excluded as the ISTAT dataset does not provide information about the sector of 
activity and size. This is not a major problem given that they represent a small percentage of companies 
controlled by Italian business groups (4.6% of the total).    10 
Vertical integration 
The boundaries of the business groups allow us to identify when different production 
activities are controlled by the same firm. We can  detect the presence of vertical 
integration within the business groups using information drawn from the input-output 
table; this can be used to determine when activities belong to the same production chain 
(Fan and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson et al., 2007). For 
every pair of industries, i-j, the input-output table allows us to calculate the percentage 
of input of industry i acquired from industry j. For example, in a group belonging to the 
clothing industry (code 18) backward integration is present if the group owns a 
company in the textile industry (code 17) given that the input-output table shows a 
positive inter-industry coefficient between the two industries. According to the Italian 
input-output table for 2000, on average, the clothing industry acquires 46.6% of its 
input from the textile industry. The way we determine vertical integration in business 
groups is not a direct indication of how much the group actually acquires from its 
controlled companies; it represents the opportunity for vertical integration between the 
two industries (Acemoglu, Aghion  et al., 2007). Moreover, the control of activities 
within the same production chain is a sign of the possibility to supply some of its own 
input and of an interest in acquiring production know-how in forward or backward 
activities. 
We use as our unit of analysis the dyadic association of activities within the same 
group. Specifically, we analyse the factors affecting the probability of  observing 
backward integration: i.e. the control of vertically related industries by the same owner. 
The Italian input-output table for 2000 contains the value of intermediate exchanges 
between 58 branches of economic activity, 22 of which are manufacturing activities. 
Indicated by j=1,2,….,22  and  i = 1,2,…, 22  for the manufacturing industries,  we 
calculate the index bij as the share of intermediate consumption of industry i supplied by 
the industry j, so that for each i  1 ij
j
b = ∑ . Combining the 22 manufacturing industries 
and the 21 potential supplier industries (excluding intra-industry exchanges) results in 
462 industry pairs. The larger is bij, the larger is the share of input requirements 
controlled by the producer in industry i in the case of integration with industry j; that is,   11 
bij is an index of the quantitative relevance of backward integration. Of the 462 potential 
backward relationships 77 are null while the others show a positive value.  
In our analysis, we compare the actual choices of groups in controlling activities along 
the production chain with the potential scope for vertical integration derived from the 
input-output table (Acemoglu et al., 2004). There are 385 industries pairs for which the 
input-output table indicates the presence of inter-industry transactions. Combined with 
the 8,661 manufacturing groups that gives us 155,711 observations at group-industry 
pair level. For example, the clothing industry acquires input from 18 other industries, 
ranging from the textile industry, representing 46.63% of the clothing producers’ input, 
to the motor vehicles industry, representing the 0.02% of the clothing producers’ input. 
Given a business group belonging to the clothing industry, we can attribute to it the 18 
potential pairs for backward integration and then observe which are present or not. This 
results in a dummy, dbij, equal to 1 if backward integration is present and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, a clothing group owning companies in all the 18 supplying industries would 
have a vector of 18 1s. Obviously, the number of industry pairs for which positive 
input-output relations are observed depends on the industry, ranging from 12 in the case 
of energy to 19 in the case of the food industry.  
Other variables  
As a proxy for the technology intensity of production, we use R&D expenditure divided 
by value added for the Italian manufacturing industry in the year 2000. Data are drawn 
from OECD (STAN ANBERD).  
To capture district-specific agglomeration forces, we use a dummy variable indicating if 
a business group belongs to an industrial district  or not. A group is  classified as 
belonging to a specific industrial cluster if its largest company is located within that 
cluster, and operates in the same specialization industry of the cluster.  
The industry specialization of the district is used to construct seven district dummies 
referring to specific industrial districts: that is, (i) food; (ii) textile and clothing; (iii) 
leather and footwear; (iv) furniture; (v) mechanical industries;
6
                                                 
6 Mechanical industries include codes from 28 to 35 (see Table 1).  
 (vi) paper and printing, 
and (vii) other industries.    12 
Industrial clusters are identified according to the ISTAT (ISTAT, 1997)  procedure 
which takes the local labour systems (LLS) as the unit of analysis and identifies 199 
industrial clusters within the 784 LLS that comprise the Italian territory. The statistical 
procedure involves two steps. First, the national territory is divided into 784 LLS which 
are groupings of contiguous municipalities that are characterised by a high degree of 
commuting by the workforce. Second, industrial districts are defined as those LLS that 
satisfy the following criteria: (i) percentage of employees engaged in manufacturing 
compared to total non-agricultural employees higher than the national average; (ii) 
specialization  in one particular manufacturing industry, and  (iii)  a higher that the 
national average percentage of workers in firms with less than 20 employees (Cannari 
and Signorini, 2000). This methodology identifies 199 industrial districts.  
As suggested by Brusco et al. (1996: 19) this methodology has some limitations. First, 
the identification of an industrial district cannot be limited to a pure statistical exercise, 
since an industrial district is not only  a production system but  also a set of social 
relationships and a system of political and cultural values. In the literature on industrial 
districts, these latter are usually referred to as the social dimension (Dei Ottati, 1994). 
Second, problems arise when a geographic area is characterized by the prevalence of 
mechanical industries, which implies multi-faceted sub-contracting systems spread 
across a number of industries; this makes it more difficult to identify mechanical 
districts on the basis of a predominant industrial sector. Finally, the identification of 
industrial districts relies mainly on arbitrary,  pre-defined  threshold values  that 
sometimes generate results that run counter to popular perceptions,  excluding 
geographic areas that historically have been considered industrial districts. For these 
reasons, some more recent studies test alternative district/agglomerations definitions, 
based on more complex and sophisticated statistical algorithms (Cannari and Signorini, 
2000; Iuzzolino, 2005).  The results of these studies are interesting, but the official 
definition of Italian industrial district adopted by ISTAT continues to be based on the 
previously described statistical procedure. 
We use various controls to take account of the presence of scale economies and market 
power. The first refers to the size of the group in terms of employees and is intended to 
capture market power as well as financial and organizational capabilities. We expect 
this variable to positively affect the ability of firms to integrate  vertically.  We use   13 
another variable for the industry as a whole, which is intended to capture economies of 
scale; it is measured as the average size of firms in the industry, in terms of the numbers 
of employees. 
Econometric modelling and estimates 
The modelling strategy  
For our empirical analysis, we identify the factors affecting the probability of observing 
backward vertical integration along the production chain. The econometric analysis is 
based on a Probit specification as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) β
' 1 Pr X X Y Φ = =  
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and 
Yi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if we observe backward integration and 0 
otherwise. X denotes the regressors. The latter includes the constant term and several 
variables at group, producing and supplying industry levels.  
The independent variables used in the regression are: i) R&D intensity of the producing 
(acquiring) sector, measured as the ratio of R&D investment on value added (resacq); 
ii) R&D intensity of the supplying sector, measured as the ratio of R&D investment on 
value added (ressup);  iii)  share of costs of the producing sector acquired from the 
supplying sector (sjk); iv) size of the group as number of employees (size); v) average 
size of firms in the producing sector (sizeacq); vi) average size of firms in the supplying 
sector (sizesup). To this specification we added a dummy variable for all the Italian 
industrial districts, and six district dummies referring to the specialization industry of 
the district.  
It  should be noted that we  first  attempt to control both for (potential) endogeneity 
problems in the agglomeration variables and technology intensity in the producing and 
supplying industries by assuming that the probability of observing backward integration 
at time t depends on these variable at time t-1. Accordingly, our proxies for spatial 
agglomeration refer to 1991, while the other covariates refer to 2000 and our dependent 
variable refers to 2001.  In Section 4.3. we propose a more formal and satisfactory 
treatment of these econometric problems, using Instrumental Variable (IV) methods.        14 
Econometric estimates 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 4. The findings reported in column 1 
and 2 show a positive and significant association between technology intensity and the 
probability of observing backward integration. Similar to Acemoglu et al.,’s (2004) 
results, the coefficient for the technology intensity of the acquiring industry (resacq) 
shows a positive and statistically significant value; moreover, it is remarkably stable 
across specifications. In contrast, the coefficient for technology intensity of the 
supplying sector is unstable to the introduction of other industry characteristics and 
never statistically significant. The other coefficients show the expected signs. The 
coefficient of the share of costs is significant and positive while the average size of 
firms in the supplying industry (which captures the intensity of industry scale 
economies) is highly significant and negative. Size of groups shows a positive and 
significant statistical association with the probability of observing backward integration.  
As far as agglomeration is concerned, we find that the coefficient of the overall district 
dummy is positive and statistically significant. It is also stable across different 
specifications. This result does not support the hypothesis that agglomeration of 
production activities tends to reduce the degree of vertical integration. On the contrary, 
it could be interpreted as evidence of a higher level of transaction costs within these 
agglomerated areas. Since technology could play an important role in this regard, we 
developed the analysis further to take account of the specialization sectors of industrial 
districts. The results show that the industry specialization of districts plays a role in 
these processes. In fact, we find a higher probability of backward integration in textiles, 
mechanical, and other manufacturing districts, while in the case of food and partially in 
the case of leather districts, agglomeration plays no role. Alongside the explanation 
related to technology, and thus to asset specificity, this result can also be explained on 
the basis of different degrees of heterogeneity of districts in terms of concentration and 
hierarchisation. 
Overall, our empirical results do not confirm the hypothesis, derived from TCE, 
according to which the probability of observing backward integration is positively 
related to the technology intensity of the supplier. On the contrary, we find that 
backward integration is more likely when the acquirer is more technology intensive, as 
suggested by the PRT.    15 
Levy (1985) proposed the hypothesis that the technology intensity of the acquirer sector 
does not matter per se, but only as a proxy for the degree of asset specificity of the 
supplier sectors. This is because ‘research intensive industries … tend to involve 
specialized inputs’ (Levy, 1985: 439). Therefore, the positive association between the 
technology intensity of the acquirer and the presence of vertical integration should also 
be interpreted as supporting the conclusions of TCE.  We disagree with this 
interpretation as our empirical evidence show a negative relation between the 
technology intensity of acquires and supplier sectors (see Table 3). 
Also, in the case of agglomeration, our empirical results challenge the hypothesis 
derived from TCE that firms belonging to industrial clusters are expected to show a low 
degree of backward integration as a result of the lower level of transaction costs 
sustained by firms operating within the same agglomerated area (industrial districts). 
This is the result of the lower level of opportunism of agents in agglomerated areas 
given cultural homogeneity and the reduction in information asymmetry. As discussed 
in Section 2, we suggest that it is not the degree of opportunism that matters, but its 
presence, and that it is the level of transaction specific investment that matters most. In 
fact, the agglomeration variable shows a significant association with the presence of 
backward integration in the case of mechanical districts rather than industrial districts 
characterized by the presence of firms operating in traditional (low tech) industries. 
Overall, our empirical results show that it is technology rather than agglomeration that 
plays the main role in influencing the decisions of firms on whether or not to integrate 
activities along the production chain. 
The control variables show the expected signs. The intensity of the input-output relation 
is positively associated with the probability of observing backward integration. This is 
explained by the fact that the greater the importance of a specific input within the firm’s 
costs, the greater will be the incentive to control the supply of this input. The size of 
supplier firms (used as a proxy for the presence of scale economies) shows a negative 
association with the presence of backward integration. This result is in accordance with 
the traditional theory of vertical integration according to which achievement of 
economies of scale in the different phases of the production chain is the main motive for 
externalizing activities (Stigler, 1951).   16 
The theoretical explanations for the positive association between the size of the group 
and the probability of observing vertical integration vary. On the one hand, this positive 
association suggests that size allows managers and entrepreneurs to relax managerial 
and financial constraints, thus increasing the probability of expanding the activities 
under their control. On the other hand, it could be that the larger the final output, the 
greater the need for the firm to control the supply of its input (Chandler, 1990).  
Robustness analysis 
In the previous section, we showed that there is a statistical association between vertical 
integration and technology intensity in the producing and supplying industries. These 
associations do not necessarily correspond to causal relationships between these two 
phenomena. In fact, as suggested by economic theory, vertical integration can affect 
technological intensity, thus generating a classical reverse causality problem. The 
presence of endogeneity – that is, one or more explanatory variables correlated with the 
error term – can generate biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients under 
investigation.  
So far we have attempted to deal with this problem imposing a time lag between the 
dependent and independent variables. We are aware that this approach is rather naïve. 
For this reason, in this section we adopt a more ‘robust’ econometric approach which 
consists of using an IV strategy, where instruments are correlated with endogenous 
variables, but uncorrelated with the error term. The variables that would satisfy these 
conditions are shares of innovative firms on total firms in the producing and supplying 
industries (limpinni and limpinnj). Note that these instruments are not perfect, but are 
useful to eliminate reverse causality problems. Using these two instruments, we test the 
presence of endogeneity of technology intensity in the producing and supplying 





 Under the null hypothesis that the model is appropriately specified 
with all explanatory variables as exogenous, the test obtained a   value of 115.75 
and p-value of 0.000. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of these two covariates can be 
rejected, suggesting that IV methods are suitable to estimate our models.  
                                                 
7 This test is implemented using the ‘probexog’ STATA command.   17 
To account for these endogeneity problems in the technology intensity indicators, we 
estimate our base line specification using  the  IV  Probit model proposed by Newey 
(1987).  This  model  fits  Probit models when one or more of the regressors are 
endogenously determined. By default, it uses maximum likelihood estimation methods. 
The results of this analysis are presented  in Table  5  and  are consistent with those 
obtained using simple Probit models, thus confirming the economic interpretation of 
these phenomena. The exogeneity problem is also confirmed by the Wald exogeneity 
test (p-value: 0.044) showing that the null hypothesis that technology intensity variables 
are not correlated with the error term can be rejected. . 
We complete our robustness check using a Linear Probability (LP) model and testing 
for non-linearity. In both cases we find confirmation of the previous analysis. Using a 
LP model, the sign and the statistical significance of the variables of interest does not 
change. Finally, using Wald-type tests of non-linear hypotheses, in which p-values are 
based on the ‘delta method’  (an  approximation appropriate for  large samples), we 
accept the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of a quadratic relation 
(these results are not shown, but are available on request). In other words, this analysis 
confirms that the linear specification adopted is appropriate.      
Conclusions 
This paper set out to empirically analyse the relationships between technology, spatial 
agglomeration and vertical integration. Despite the relevance of this line of research, 
only a few contributions so far provide insights on this topic. Specifically, while there 
are several theories about the effect of technology and technological change on the 
internal organization of firms, there is little empirical evidence on the relation between 
technology and vertical integration (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 26).  
Taking the business group as the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s boundary, our 
work makes three contributions to this literature. First, it shows that vertical integration 
is influenced by technology as the technology intensity of the buying industry plays a 
positive role in influencing backward integration. This result is in accordance with the 
hypothesis derived from the PRT (Acemoglu et al., 2004). In contrast, the technology 
intensity of the supplier has no statistically significant influence on the probability of 
observing backward integration. This result lends no support to the hypothesis, derived   18 
from TCE, suggesting a positive relation between the technology intensity of suppliers 
and the presence of vertical integration.  
Second, we detect the influence of spatial agglomeration on firms’ vertical integration 
decisions. We show that belonging to a specialized cluster – in our case an industrial 
district – can have a positive impact on vertical integration: that is, on the control of the 
different stages of the production chain. This result is also at variance  with the 
hypothesis derived from TCE according to which low transaction costs – and thus a low 
level of vertical integration – should be observed within agglomerated areas.  
Finally, we show that this result is not homogeneous across clusters, but is strongly 
affected by the industry in which the cluster specializes. Specifically, the positive 
influence of agglomeration forces in determining vertical integration is particularly 
significant for mechanical  districts, but not for clusters specializing  in  ‘traditional’ 
industries. Our findings show that the hypothesis that lower transaction costs within 
industrial clusters favours vertical disintegration is not consistent with the evidence, 
especially with regard to mechanical districts. This points to the important role of 
technology rather than agglomeration in influencing the vertical integration choices of 
firms.  
This paper is among the few that  attempt to analyse the determinants of vertical 
integration choices using large data sets rather than firm or industry case studies. As 
such it has some limitations, mainly related to the availability of data. The most 
important of these is the use of cross-section data. We control for endogeneity problems 
in the technology intensity variables in two ways: (i) by assuming a time lag between 
dependent and independent variables and (ii) by adopting an IV strategy.  
We detect the presence of vertical integration  in business groups  by observing the 
activities they control and assessing the intensity of supplier-acquirer relationships 
using the coefficients taken from input-output tables. In doing so, we are not measuring 
the effective presence of exchanges within the group but whether the group can 
potentially supply some of its input from controlled companies. We do not think that 
this is a major limitation for two reasons: on the one hand, it is plausible to assume that 
if a firm controls an activity along the same production chain this is with the aim of 
controlling the supply of some input; and, on the other hand, despite the actual amount 
of exchanges within the companies of the group, the control of vertically integrated   19 
activities signals the interest of the firm in acquiring technical knowledge in those 
activities, which can be considered an important move in a vertical integration strategy. 
Moreover, the use of this methodology allows us to study vertical integration choices 
based on a large data set. Despite these possible limitations we think that the empirical 
results presented here make a contribution to our understanding of the determinants in 
the vertical integration choices of firms, and give a basis on which the analysis can be 
further refined at both empirical and theoretical levels. 
Finally, the implications of our study from the business and policy perspectives are also 
interesting. Business groups have been used here as unit of analysis in examining Italian 
manufacturing but business groups are not peculiar to certain industries or countries; 
they are the organizational form typically adopted by entrepreneurs and managers to 
maintain and expand their control over business activities  and  the main trend in 
organization design since the 1970s has been towards enhancement of the operative 
autonomy of organizational units. In this context,  the group has emerged as an 
organizational form specifically adapted to coping with the new conditions of markets 
and technology. The second implication concerns the role of agglomeration forces as 
determinants of firms’ organisation. This topic  has received little  attention in the 
management and economics literature but seems important for understanding the factors 
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Table 1 – Statistics on business groups by industry 
Code  Industry 














15  Food products and beverages  643  7.4  4.6  189.0  5.6 
17  Textiles  549  6.3  3.6  164.4  4.4 
18  Clothing  357  4.1  4.3  144.1  16.8 
19  Leather and leather products  281  3.2  3.3  121.8  8.5 
20  Lumber and wood products  158  1.8  3.0  92.4  8.9 
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  157  1.8  3.5  199.2  3.8 
22  Printing and publishing  523  6.0  3.9  122.1  4.0 
23  Petroleum refining and related industries  35  0.4  6.8  347.1  0.0 
24  Chemicals and allied products  443  5.1  3.9  299.7  6.3 
25  Rubber and plastic products  523  6.0  3.7  127.3  16.4 
26  Non-metallic mineral products  524  6.1  4.7  246.3  11.5 
27  Primary metal industries  226  2.6  4.4  377.9  4.4 
28  Fabricated metal products  1,131  13.1  3.2  96.8  9.2 
29  Industrial machinery and home appliances  1,375  15.9  4.2  198.7  26.8 
30  Office machinery and computers  70  0.8  3.1  82.7  27.1 
31  Electrical equipment and apparatus  395  4.6  5.1  197.7  19.5 
32  Electronic equipment and components  183  2.1  7.7  696.4  24.0 
33  Measuring and controlling instruments  242  2.8  3.1  161.8  21.5 
34  Automobiles and components  177  2.0  3.3  529.9  39.5 
35  Other transportation vehicles  118  1.4  3.2  176.8  32.8 
36  Other manufacturing industries  551  6.4  3.1  106.4  17.8 
Total    8,661  100.0  4.0  189.1  14.3 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for industry characteristics 
Code  Industry 
R&D on 
value added 




















15  Food products and beverages  0.4  7.5  38.2  6.7 
17  Textiles  0.1  6.5  28.7  10.5 
18  Clothing  0.1  3.7  20.3  6.8 
19  Leather and leather products  0.1  4.4  22.5  9.1 
20  Lumber and wood products  0.1  8.4  39.4  3.7 
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  0.1  10.2  35.8  18.3 
22  Printing and publishing  0.1  9.7  34.5  6.5 
23  Petroleum refining and related industries  2.5  2.8  43.0  58.4 
24  Chemicals and allied products  4.7  14.3  51.2  35.0 
25  Rubber and plastic products  7.1  4.9  54.7  16.3 
26  Non-metallic mineral products  0.3  5.2  44.0  9.5 
27  Primary metal industries  0.4  5.2  44.1  41.7 
28  Fabricated metal products  0.3  5.9  39.1  7.3 
29 
Industrial machinery and home 
appliances  0.3  6.1  44.8  14.3 
30  Office machinery and computers  7.4  17.6  82.4  11.9 
31  Electrical equipment and apparatus  1.9  5.6  35.9  11.4 
32  Electronic equipment and components  18.3  59.5  61.8  12.2 
33  Measuring and controlling instruments  5.0  11.5  73.3  5.1 
34  Automobiles and components  9.5  11.6  42.0  98.4 
35  Other transportation vehicles  11.0  17.7  31.7  21.7 
36  Other manufacturing industries  0.2  4.0  37.6  6.0 
Sources:  (1) OECD, STAN ANBERD, 2006 
  (2) ISTAT, L’innovazione nelle imprese italiane negli anni 1998-2000 
  (3) ISTAT, Censimento dell’industria 
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
1  1           
2  -0.0411  1         
3  0.0161  -0.0338  1       
4  0.0845  -0.0071  -0.0082  1     
5  0.5205  -0.0205  -0.0113  0.1522  1   
6  -0.0125  0.4901  0.1182  -0.0063  -0.0301  1 
1 - R&D on value added of buyer sector 
2 - R&D on value added supplier sector 
3 - Share of input of sector i bought by sector j 
4 - Size of group 
5 - Average size of firms in buyer sector 
6 - Average size of firms in supplier sector 
   











  Coeff.  t-values  Coeff.  t-values  Coeff.  t-values  Coeff.  t-values 
Dependent variable: dbij (presence of backward integration) 
sjk  0.022**  3.73  0.025**  4.04  0.025**  4.42  0.025**  4.05 
ln(resacq)  0.064**  3.55  0.047**  2.45  0.049*  2.01  0.046**  2.36 
ln(ressup)  -0.017  -1.18  -0.016  -1.10  0.012  0.76  -0.016  -1.11 
Dis  0.063**  3.20  0.060**  3.10  0.060**  3.01  --  -- 
ln(size)  --  --  0.219**  20.25  --  --  0.219**  20.21 
ln(sizeacq)  --  --  --  --  0.072  1.11  --  -- 
ln(sizesup)  --  --  --  --  -0.141**  -3.31  --  -- 
Dis_food  --  --  --  --  --  --  -0.001  -0.02 
Dis_tex  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.052  1.50 
Dis_lea  --  --  --  --  --  --  -0.019  -0.33 
Dis_mech  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.097**  3.23 
Dis_oth  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.052*  1.62 
                 
N. Obs.  155,671  155,671  155,671  155,671 
Clustering  369 industry pairs 369 industry pairs 369 industry pairs 369 industry pairs 
Pseudo R
2  0.029  0.092  0.036  0.093 
          Note: 
Regressions include a constant term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
industry pair level. 
Legend: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.   26 






Linear probability model 
(3) 
Linear probability model  
IV 
  Coeff.  t-values  Coeff.  t-values  Coeff.  t-values 
sjk  0.026**  4.01  0.001**  2.61  0.018**  2.61 
ln(resacq)  --  --  0.001**  2.15  --  -- 
ln(ressup)  --  --  -0.0006  -1.12  --  -- 
^ln(resacq)  0.073**  2.76  --  --  0.002**  2.63 
^ln(ressup)  0.033  1.36  --  --  0.001  1.15 
ln(size)  0.216**  19.69  0.011**  11.02  0.010**  11.30 
Dis_food  -0.003  -0.06  -0.001  -0.91  -0.001  -0.90 
Dis_tex  0.069**  2.07  0.001  0.78  0.001  1.17 
Dis_lea  0.008  0.16  -0.002  -0.97  -0.001  -0.67 
Dis_mech  0.096**  3.11  0.003*  1.89  0.003*  1.87 
Dis_oth  0.059*  1.77  0.001  0.78  0.001  0.92 
             
N. Obs.  155,671  155,671  155,671 
Clustering  369 industry pairs  369 industry pairs  369 industry pairs 
Wald text of exogeneity  
(p-value)  0.044  --  -- 
       
Notes: 
(a) The regression also includes a constant term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the industry pair level. 
(b) Intrumented:  ln(resacq); ln(ressup) 
(c) Intruments: bij, ln(size), Dis_food, Dis_tex, Dis_lea, Dis_mech, Dis_oth, limpinni, limpinnj 
Legend: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 